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ALLOCATION OF DAMAGES UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
Contribution and indemnity are the two most common techniques
for distributing judgment and settlement costs among joint violators of
the federal securities laws. Contribution, which involves the distribu-
tion of costs among jointly liable' parties, requires each party to pay a
proportionate share of the damages.' By contrast, indemnity shifts the
entire loss from one party to another.3 Increasing judicial hostility to-
ward indemnity contracts,4 however, has caused a growing number of
I. In order to seek contribution, a party must be liable to the same person for the same
harm. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979). See
also Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233, 236 (1937) ("[t]he right to sue for contribution
does not depend upon a prior determination that the defendants are liable, because whether they
are liable is the matter to be decided in the suit"); Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1277
(E.D. La. 1979) (actions of joint tortfeasors may be independent as long as both induce the same
harm).
2. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 310; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 81 (1937).
The goal of contribution is the equitable distribution of damages among those persons who have
jointly caused an identical harm by requiring each to pay his proportionate share. See Fischer,
Contribution in lob-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1821, 1821 (1978).
The theoretical basis of contribution seems to be in doubt. 25 AM. U.L. REV. 203, 217-18
(1975). While some cases have suggested that it is based on an implied contract, other cases have
suggested quasi-contract as a more appropriate theory to prevent unjust enrichment. Id Two
commentators have argued, however, that it makes no difference what basis is accepted as long as
the court follows principles of equity and justice and attempts to be fair to all the parties. See
Leflar, Contribution andIndemniy Between Tort/easors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 137 (1932); Turck,
Contribution Between Tortfeasors in American and German Law-A Comparative Study, 41 TUL. L.
REv. 1, 28 (1966).
3. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1979); W. PROSSER, supra note 1,
§ 51 at 310; Ruder, Multple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding andAbetting, Can-
spirac, In Pari Delicto, Indemnfcation. and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 647 (1972).
4. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.24 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); Freund & Hacker, Cutting Up the Humble Pie: .4 PracticalApproach to Ap-
portioning Litigation Risks Among Underwriters, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 461, 472-73 (1974); Note,
The Role of Contribution in Determining Underwriters' Liabili y Under Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 63 VA. L. REv. 79, 87 (1977).
The first case to deny enforcement of an indemnity claim in the federal securities area was
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970). The jury in the trial court had found that the issuer, underwriter, and president had
knowingly misrepresented the status of a material contract in violation of Section 17(a) of the
1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id at 1278-79. Even though the contract by its terms
did not apply to intentional violations, id at 1287, the court based its decision on the broad public
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policy grounds of deterrence of securities violations, id at 1289. The court noted that civil liability
under the federal securities laws was designed not so much to compensate the injured party as to
promote enforcement of the Act and to deter negligence and intentional violations by providing a
penalty for those who fail in their duty. Id Accord, Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F.
Supp. 946, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 168 (D.
Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). This is called the in ter-
rorem effect of civil liability. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1831 (2d ed. 1961).
The Globus court also noted three other factors that supported its holding: (1) indemnification
of the underwriter by the issuer is particularly suspect because the recovery would ultimately
come out of the pockets of the shareholders, the very purchasers who were damaged; (2) it is an
established principle that one cannot insure himself against his own reckless or willful misconduct;
and (3) 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1970) supported its decision. 418 F.2d at 1288-89.
17 C.F.R. § 230.460, comment a (1981) states in part:
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 may
be permitted to directors, officers and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to
the foregoing provisions, or otherwise, the registrant has been advised that in the opinion
of the Securities and Exchange Commission such indemnification is against public policy
as expressed in the act and is, therefore, unenforceable.
id
Since Globus, courts have been viewing indemnity contracts with increasing disfavor. See
Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Hor-
wath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 38 (2d Cir. 1976); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 237
(7th Cir. 1974); South Side Bank & Trust Co. v. Walston & Co., 425 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1970);
Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1275-76 (E.D. La. 1979); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.
Supp. 1251, 1267 (D. DeL 1978), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Odette v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,544 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); deHaas v.
Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo. 1968), qJd in part and vacated in part, 435
F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
All courts currently deny indemnification to intentional securities violators. See, e.g.,
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3114 (1981); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1974);
South Side Bank & Trust Co. v. Walston & Co., 425 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1970); McLean v.
Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.
1979); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), aJ'd in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Globus v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afd in part and rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 816
(D. Colo. 1968), afd inpart and vacated inpart, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
At present there is a split of authority concerning whether all indemnification contracts or only
those that allow an intentional violator to recover indemnity are void as against public policy.
Compare South Side Bank & Trust Co. v. Walston, 425 F.2d 40,43 (7th Cir. 1970) (all indemnifi-
cation contracts unenforcible); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 168 (D.
Del 1974) (same), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) and State Mut. Life
Assurance Co. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 FR.D. 202, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (same) with
Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1974) (no indemnification of intentional
violators); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1267 (D. Del. 1978) (same), rev'd on other
grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 954
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same); Muth v. Deckert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
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courts and commentators to focus on contribution.5 Because the con-
(same); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (same), af'din part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Globus v. Law Research
Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same), a 'dinpart and rev'd inpart, 418 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) and deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F.
Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo. 1968) (same), aft'd in part and vacated inpart, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1970).
This distinction between intentional and negligent violators has lost much of its importance in
Rule lOb-5 actions since the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976). The Court in flochfelder ruled that scienter (mental state embracing the intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud) was a necessary element in a Rule lOb-5 action. Id at 212.
Thus, present law under Rule lob-5 precludes any claim for indemnity, because a defendant can
now be held liable only if he intentionally violates Rule 10b-5, and all courts are in agreement that
intentional wrongdoers cannot obtain indemnity. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334
(7th Cir. 1979) ("[i]n order to be found liable under Rule lOb-5, one must be found to have
scienter or intent to defraud and such a person should not get off... through indemnification");
Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1275-76 (E.D. La. 1979) ("[p]resent state of the law under
Rule lOb-5 precludes any claim for indemnity... [because] Abraham can be held liable to Mar-
rero ... only if he acted with scienter, the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"); McLean v.
Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266 n.49 (D. Del. 1978) ("under Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder...
active wrongdoing alone gives liability under Rule lob-5 and consequently Rule lOb-5 is an inap-
propriate context for application of the principles of indemnification"), rev'don othergrounds, 599
F 2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1976).
Some district courts have ruled that recklessness also satisfies the scienter requirement of
Hochfelder. See Spectrum Financial Co. v. Marconsult, 608 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 936 (1980); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979);
Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolfv. Blyth,
Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco Indus.,
Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978); First Va.
Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
875 (1977).
The Supreme Court in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980), held that § 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), requires scienter to be present in order to
establish a cause of action under § 17(aX1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or (3). Thus, indemnity is
never appropriate under § 17(a)(l), but may be under § 17(a)(2) or (3). Section 17(a), which ap-
plies only to sellers, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
5. See Fischer, siypra note 2; Freund & Hacker, supra note 4; Ruder, supra note 3; Note,
supra note 4; Note, Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1256.
In certain situations, although a party's culpability may preclude indemnity, contribution may
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cept of contribution is relatively new in the securities area, courts have
not yet developed a uniform approach for determining each party's
proportionate share.6
Contribution is an equitable doctrine based on the principle that all
parties responsible for a wrong should share the financial burden
still be appropriate. See, e.g., Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1974) (a
party "too culpable to be entitled to indemnification... may nonetheless be entitled to contribu-
tion"); Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist. Facilities Corp. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 197,269, at 96,916-17 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (deterrence policies of securities
laws prompt the conclusion that a party should be permitted to receive contribution even if found
to be an intentional violator); Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1277 (E.D. La. 1979)
(contribution is appropriate even in the case of the culpable defendant in order to allow for the
fair distribution of the damages among the violators); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F.
Supp. 946, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (deterrence policies of the securities laws that preclude indem-
nification prompt the conclusion that contribution should be allowed regardless of fault); Alexan-
der & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
("degree of culpability is not material to the question of whether defendants in a securities fraud
case may seek contribution from each other"). But see Fischer, supra note 2, at 1827 ("equal
culpability may be the sine qua non of allowing contribution under the federal securities acts").
The deterrence policies of preventing wrongdoers from escaping all liability are best served by
allowing contribution, which requires all parties to share the burden of their actions. See, e.g.,
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 38 (2d Cir. 1967) (denying
contribution would dilute the deterrent effect of the securities laws by allowing violators to escape
liability for their wrongdoing); Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1277-78 (E.D. La. 1979)
(rule disallowing contribution would make no sense at all in light of deterrence policies of the
federal securities laws); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (D. Del.
1974) ("availability of contribution would tend to insure that all individuals jointly liable for a
violation of § 14(a) would have some responsibility for damages"), vacated on other grounds, 535
F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F.
Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ('[blecause of the deterrent policy of the securities laws, even
intentional tortfeasors may obtain contribution so that other tortfeasors will not escape liability");
Liggett & Myers, Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (sound policy rea-
sons for allowing contribution are to deter violations of the securities laws and prevent future
violations); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973) ('joint-
tortfeasor[s] should be held to contribution to facilitate enforcement of the obligations imposed by
the Securities Act").
The only section that precludes a defendant from contribution due to culpability is § 11(f) of the
Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976).
There are still several American state courts that continue to deny a right to contribution in
favor of an intentional tortfeasor. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 557 (5th Cir.
1981). See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 308; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(3),
Comment j (1977).
6. Compare McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978) (court used a compara-
tive fault allocation), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) with Gould v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974) (court used a benefits-derived method of
allocation), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) and Herzfeld v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976) (court used a pro rata allocation).
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caused by their action.7 No one party should bear the sole burden of
payment. Rather, all parties should pay the proportionate share of the
damages they caused.8
Before Congress passed the Securities Act of 19339 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,10 a common law right of contribution among
defendants did not exist.' The securities acts, however, expressly
granted a right of contribution in those sections that provided a private
right of action.' 2 Subsequently, as the federal courts began to recog-
nize implied private rights of action under various antifraud provisions
of the securities laws,' 3 litigants urged the courts to imply a right of
contribution under these sections.
Although the first court presented with this issue rejected an implied
right of contribution,' 4 the result was short-lived. The court in deHaas
7. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 310.
8. Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in MutilartyActions Under Rule 1Ob-., 66 IowA L.
REV. 533, 536 (1981); Fischer, supra note 2, at 1821; Note, supra note 5, at 1261.
9. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1976).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1976).
1 I. The common-law rule barring contribution originated in the case of Merryweather v.
Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). Although this case denied contribution
only to intentional tortfeasors, early American courts expanded the decision to deny all contribu-
tion. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 305-07; Fischer, supra note 2, at 1825; Ruder, supra
note 3, at 647-49.
The Supreme Court acknowledged this rule in Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.,
196 U.S. 217 (1905). The Court stated: "mhe general principle of law is well settled that one of
several wrongdoers cannot recover against another wrongdoer, although he may have been com-
pelled to pay all the damages for the wrong done." Id at 224.
12. Section 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes civil liability on any person
who engages in manipulative activities with respect to exchange-listed securities. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(e) (1976). This section provides that "[every person who becomes liable to make any pay-
ment under this subsection may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who,
if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment." Id
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976), makes a company
liable for damages to any person who buys or sells its securities in reliance on a misleading state-
ment contained in any document filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Sec-
tion 18(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for a right of contribution similar to
that provided by § 9(e) of the 1934 Act. Section 1 l(f) of the Securities Act of 1933 also grants a
right of contribution, but imposes the limitation that a party guilty of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion may not seek contribution from a merely negligent defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976).
13. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1976) (§ 10(b)); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (§ 10(b)); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972) (§ 10(b)); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971) (§ 10(b)); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (§ 14(a)).
14. Shea v. Ungar [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,558 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). This court refused to depart from the common-law bar against contribution in the absence
of express congressional intent. Id at 95,108.
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v. Empire Petroleum Co. 15 reasoned that because Congress provided for
contribution in sections that contain express liability provisions, contri-
bution should also be permitted when the court finds implied liabil-
ity. 16 The Second Circuit 7 reinforced deHaas by affirming the trial
court decision in Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Service, Inc. 18 The
Globus trial court reasoned that an implied right of contribution would
promote the policy of deterrence by encouraging "diligence, investiga-
tion, and compliance."' 19 An implied right of contribution is now uni-
formly recognized under the federal securities laws.20
15. 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), a'd in part and vacated inpart, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th
Cir. 1970).
16. Id at 815-16. Of the seven express civil remedies provided in the Securities Act of 1933
(15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (1976)) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p,
78r, 78t (1976)), three provide express rights of contribution: Securities Act of 1933 § 1(f), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976); and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(b) (1976). See Alexander & Baldwin,
Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974):
There is no express statutory provision for contribution with respect to Sections 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, or 17(a) of the 1933 Act, undoubtedly because there is no express right
of action under these sections .... mhe policy considerations which persuaded Con-
gress to allow contribution where it granted a private right of action should persuade
courts to allow contribution where the courts implied such a right.
17. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941
(1971).
18. 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 941 (1971).
19. Id at 958 (quoting Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1289 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970)). The court also noted the general state trend toward
contribution and that the granting of contribution in other liability sections provided a persuasive
analogy. Id at 956-57.
This court's analysis is consistent with the established approach of the Supreme Court in inter-
preting the various federal securities provisions as integrated and consistent parts of a single
framework. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749-54 (1975). See also ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1724 (Proposed
Official Draft 1978).
20. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 556-59 (5th Cir. 1981) (implied
right of contribution under § 10(b)); Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637
F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3114 (1981); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601
F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979) (implied right of contribution under Rule lOb-5 and § 10(b)); In re
National Student Marketing Litigation, 517 F. Supp. 1345, 1346-48, (D.D.C. 1981) (implied right
of contribution under § 10(b)); Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180, 1185
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (now well settled that implied right of contribution exists under the securities
laws); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266-68 (D. Del. 1978) (implied right of contribu-
tion under § 10(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Rice v. McDonnell &
Co., 442 F. Supp. 952, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (implied right of contribution under federal securities
laws); Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1367 (D. Md. 1975) (implied right of contribution
under § 10(b)), aft'd, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F.
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Although federal common law governs contribution in actions in-
volving violations of the securities acts, 21 federal courts nevertheless do
Supp. 946, 958-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (implied right of contribution under §§ 10(b), 12(2), 15(c), and
17(a)); Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (implied right of
contribution under § 10(b)); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D.
Del. 1974) (implied right of contribution under § 14(a)), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761
(3d Cir. 1976); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (implied right of contribution under § 10(b)); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co.,
366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (implied right of contribution under §§ 10(b), 12(2), 15(c),
and 17(a)); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.1LD. 620,623 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (implied right of
action under § 10(b)).
The Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the issue of whether there is an implied right of
contribution under the securities acts. See cases cited supra. However, the Court did expressly
decline the opportunity to restrict this expansion of the right of contribution by denying certiorari
in a recent Ninth Circuit case. Frank v. United States Trust Co., 101 S. Ct. 3114 (1981), denying
cert. sub non to Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672 (9th Cir.
1980). This denial has been construed as indicating the Supreme Court's acceptance of the im-
plied right of contribution under the federal securities laws. In re National Student Marketing
Litigation, 517 F. Supp. 1345, 1346-48 (D.D.C. 1981).
21. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 557 (5th Cir. 1981); Alley v.
Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1381 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 331 (7th
Cir. 1979); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182
(8th Cir. 1979); In re National Student Marketing Litigation, 517 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (D.D.C.
1981); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1267 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other ground, 599
F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D. Del.
1974), vacatedon other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Liggett & Meyers, Inc. v. Bloomfield,
380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 625
(SD.N.Y. 1972); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.),
afd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum
Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968), aF'd in part and vacatedinpart, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th
Cir. 1970). But see Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 3 8-39 (2d
Cir. 1976); New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
97,618, at 98,341-42 (S.D.N.Y.); Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180, 1189
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D. 202,
212 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
This is an exception to the general rule that a court should look to the applicable state statute
when determining a third-party defendant's liability for contribution under a federal statute.
Brown v. UAW, 85 F.R.D. 328, 334 n.l (W.D. Mich. 1980). See 3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1771-
72:
In federally created actions at law "the silence of Congress has been interpreted to
mean that it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limitation." This rule is followed
even though it often makes the result vary depending upon the state in which the action
is brought, and even though, especially under a statute like the 1934 act which provides
for a broad choice of venue and nationwide service of process, it permits the plaintiff a
considerable amount of forum-shopping.
Id (footnotes omitted). See also Fischer, supra note 2, at 1828:
The position of the several federal courts, which hold that the application of the doc-
trine of contribution in a lOb-5 case is a matter of federal law, appears to be inconsistent
with the general tendency of the federal courts to adopt and apply pertinent state statutes
in areas left unprovided for in a federal statutory scheme.
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not approach contribution issues uniformly.2 2 Nonetheless, certain is-
sues almost always arise in cases involving contribution. This Note
concentrates on two of the major contribution issues. First, this Note
analyzes the effect of settlements on settling and nonsettling joint viola-
tors and then suggests an efficient approach to settlement problems that
is consistent with the policies of the securities acts. Second, this Note
discusses various allocation methods and suggests an approach for a
court faced with the problem of allocating a plaintiff's judgment award
among joint defendants.
11. EFFECTS OF SETTLEMENTS
Private actions under the federal securities laws are resolved primar-
Courts justify this exception by contending that contribution is an important element in the
enforcement of the securities laws and is properly governed by federal law in order to provide
uniformity, which is important "in a scheme as comprehensive as the federal regulation of securi-
ties." Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1276 (E.D. La. 1979). See Heizer Corp. v. Ross,
601 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1979); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D.
Iowa 1973). See generally Fischer, supra note 2, at 1828-29.
22. Traditionally, the federal common law did not even recognize a right of contribution.
See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Shop Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952) (refused to
fashion a rule of contribution in the absence of specific legislation); Union Stock Yards Co. v.
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 196 U.S. 217, 224 (1905) ("general principle of law is well settled that one of
several wrongdoers cannot recover against another wrongdoer, although he may have been com-
pelled to pay all the damages for the wrong done").
The traditional bar against contribution adopted by the federal courts was justified on three
grounds: (1) the effectiveness of discouraging antisocial conduct would be diluted; (2) contribu-
tion is an equitable remedy and one should not be able to come into equity with unclean hands;
and (3) judicial time and energy should be conserved. See Bohlen, Contribution and lndemnily
Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552, 557-60 (1936); Jones, Contribution Among Tortfeasors,
11 U. FLA. L. Ry. 175 (1958); Leflar, supra note 2, at 131-46; Turck, supra note 2, at 10.
Now, the courts are split over the question of whether there is a federal common-law right of
contribution. Compare Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981) (anti-
trust decision in which Supreme Court denied a federal common-law right to contribution) and
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (no federal right of
contribution for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974) with United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975) (contribution allowed in collision admiralty case);
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 110 (1974) (contribution allowed in
non-collision admiralty cases) and Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974)
(federal common law of contribution adopted regarding mid-air collisions). It must be noted,
however, that admiralty law is often considered "an historical aberration of the federal common
law." Note, Carve-Out as an Answer to the Contribution Question in Private Antitrust Litigation, 58
WASH. U.L.Q. 975, 1000 (1980) (citing 1 E. BENEDICT, ON ADMIRALTY § 104 (7th ed. 1974) and
G. GILSOMER & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 2 (2d ed. 1975)). See also Leflar, supra note
2, at 138-39 ("[in admiralty, the courts have felt free to develop their own rules uncontrolled by
the common law decisions").
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ily by settlement rather than by trial.23 In cases involving more than
one defendant, however, some of the defendants may settle with the
injured party while one or more of the other defendants choose not to
settle.24 When this mixture of settling and nonsettling defendants de-
velops, the plaintiff must decide whether to bring action against the
remaining nonsettling parties.25 If the plaintiff anticipates a recovery
significantly greater than the estimated litigation costs, the claim is pur-
sued.26 If the plaintiff then recovers against the nonsettling defendants,
two questions arise: first, whether the nonsettling defendants can seek
contribution from the parties who originally settled with the plaintiff;
and second, whether the plaintiff's settlement proceeds will have an ef-
fect on the judgment awarded the plaintiff against the nonsettling
defendants.27
23. See Adamski, supra note 8, at 533; Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Securi-
ties Cases and the Effects ofDamages on Liabiity, 46 FoRDH-AM L. REv. 277, 277 (1977).
24. See Note, supra note 5, at 1292. In some cases the defendants will contest liability or
damages and refuse to settle, while in others, the plaintiffwiU refuse to release certain defendants.
Id There also may be nonmonetary factors involved such as time, publicity, or a desire just to
return to ordinary business routine. See Freund & Hacker, supra note 4, at 477; Note, supra note
5, at 1292.
25. If the plaintiff does pursue this claim, the court will have to determine the effect of the
settlement on the judgment award. The effect of settlements on the right of contribution is a
problem that has plagued courts and commentators in recent years. See Fischer, supra note 2, at
1831-36; Freund & Hacker, supra note 4, at 492-93; Note, supra note 5, at 1292-1303. Cf.
Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions Under the FederalAntitrust Laws, 33
Sw. LJ. 779, 809-15 (1979) (addressing the effect of settlement on the right of contribution in
antitrust field); Note, Contribution and Antitrust Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890, 906-10 (1980)
(same).
This is also an issue that has plagued the state courts in tort cases. W. PROSSER, supra note 1,
§ 50, at 309-10 states:
The effect of a settlement with the plaintiff by the contribution defendant, in which he
received a release or a covenant not to sue, has perhaps given more difficulty than any
other problem. The usual holding has been that the defendant so relieved of liability is
not released from contribution. There has been much dissatisfaction with this because it
becomes impossible for a defendant to settle the case, take a release, and close the file,
since the potential for liability is still open. On the other hand, the proposed solution of
a pro rata reduction of the amount remaining due discourages plaintiffs from accepting
smaller settlements from one defendant. In either case, both parties complain.
Id (footnotes omitted).
26. See Freund & Hacker, supra note 4, at 477; Note, supra note 5, at 1292.
27. After a court decides whether to allow contribution, the next step is to determine the
effect of the prior settlement on the size of the judgment recoverable by the plaintiff. A court
should award damages to make the plaintiff whole, but should not grant him recovery for more
than his injury. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976), provides in
part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity, but no person permitted to
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A. Settlements Competing Objectives
Courts must balance two competing objectives when determining
maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through
satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of.
See also McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1271 (D. Del. 1978) ("the guiding principle is
that the plaintiff is entitled to be made whole but that he may not be able to recover more than his
loss"), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 172 (D. Del. 1974) (fundamental principle is that a plaintiff may not recover
more than his injury in the legal process), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976);
Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) ("[tlairness between the parties... requires that when one tortfeasor settles with an injured
party, he should get no more than he bargained for"). Thus, in order to avoid unjustly enriching
the plaintiff, the gross judgment should be reduced by at least the amount received in settlement.
The nonsettling defendant, however, still has the burden of demonstrating that the same meas-
ure of damages allocated in the settlement would have been applied to the settling defendants if
they had been named in the original action. If any part of the settlement award was based on a
claim not presented at trial, the part of the award allocated to that claim may not be credited
against the judgment award or the settling parties' proportionate share. See McLean v. Alexan-
der, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1256 (D. Del.) (claims against the settling parties are derivative in the
sense that settling parties are only liable if plaintiff would have prevailed against them in the
original action), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Gould v. American-Hawai-
ian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 172 (D. Del. 1974) (defendants must show that the same measure of
damages was used in computing settlement award as well as judgment award), vacated on other
grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 385 F. Supp. 230,239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (since an undetermined part of a settlement related
to a claim in which original defendant was not liable, that part of award cannot be credited
against judgment).
See also UNIFORM CoNrRBUroN AMONo TORT EASORS AcT § 4 (1939), which states:
A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment,
does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the
claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the re-
lease, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim
shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
In addition to reducing the judgment award, a court should also reduce the settling party's
proportionate share of the damages by the amount he previously paid in settlement. McLean v.
Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1271 (D. Del. 1978) (fairness demands that settling party's share
should be reduced by the settlement amount or else settling party in essence will have to pay
damages twice), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("fairness between the
parties" requires that the settling defendants should be entitled to deduct from their proportionate
share the sum already paid in settlement).
For example, suppose A and B combined to cause C $100,000 in damages, A and B each being
responsible for one-half the harm. Subsequently A settles with C for $25,000. At trial, C's judg-
ment should be reduced to $75,000 ($100,000 minus $25,000 already received), while A only
should be liable for $25,000 in contribution ($50,000 proportionate share minus $25,000 prior
payment). This would result in C receiving his full $100,000 equally from both A and B.
If A's proportionate share was not reduced by his prior payment in settlement of $25,000, A
would have to contribute half of the judgment award, or $37,500. This would result in A paying
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whether to allow the nonsettling defendants the right to obtain contri-
bution from the settling defendant.28 On the one hand, public policy
strongly favors settlement in securities suits.29 The motivations for set-
tlement include avoidance of the potential liability,30 limitation of the
time expended,3 I and reduction in the expenses of securities litigation.32
A defendant's desire to settle will be diminished significantly if he
knows that a court will force him subsequently to contribute to the
nonsettling party.3
On the other hand, barring contribution from settling defendants
may operate to make nonsettling defendants pay a disproportionate
share of the damages caused by all-both settling and nonsettling-
defendants.3 4  Denying contribution also increases the possibility of
S62,500 ($25,000 + $37,500), while B would pay only $37,500. Such a burden on a settling party
would significantly deter settlements.
28. See Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3114 (1981); Games v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468-69 (3d Cir.
1967); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266 (D. Del. 1978), rey'don other grounds, 599
F2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). See generally W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 50, at 309-10. See also Fischer, supra note 2, at
1833 (results in settlement cases should further the competing policies of equitable sharing of costs
among the defendants, encouraging settlements, and promoting finality).
29. See, e.g., Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 79 F.R.D. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Stull v.
Baker, 410 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 174
(SD.N.Y. 1972). See generally Adamski, supra note 8, at 534; Fischer, supra note 2, at 1831-36.
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 865 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). See generally Adamski, supra note 8, at 533.
31. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981) (eight years
from time of filing suit in district court until appellate court decision); In re National Student
Marketing Litigation, 517 F. Supp. 1345 (D.D.C. 1981) (11 years).
32. See Note, supra note 25, at 913; Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. Ray.
486, 489 (1966).
33. See Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1967); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.
Supp. 1251, 1266 (D. Del. 1978), rey'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Altman v.
Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The argument has been raised
that allowing contribution in settlement cases would undermine the deterrence policies of the
securities laws. See, e.g., Note, supra note 25, at 910-11. This argument is based on the theory
that most potential defendants are adverse to risk and would prefer the certainty of a smaller loss
with contribution to the possibility of a larger loss without contribution. Id Compare McLean v.
Alexander, 449 F. Supp. at 1266 (to deny contribution favors deterrence policies of the Securities
Acts), rer'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) with Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp.,
54 F.R.D. at 624-25 (to allow contribution favors deterrence policies of the Acts).
34. A dramatic example of a defendant bearing losses significantly greater than his propor-
tionate share due to the unavailability of contribution is the antitrust case of Olson Farms, Inc. v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 79,699 (10th Cir.), in which the nonsettling
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collusion between the plaintiff and settling defendants. 35 In addition,
when one defendant settles in a jurisdiction that habitually denies con-
tribution, the plaintiff can coerce the remaining defendants into ac-
cepting unfavorable settlements by subjecting them to increased
liability.3 6
The courts in securities cases routinely hold that contribution is
available from the nonsettling defendant.37  And despite objections
party, who was the smallest of all the price-fixers, was sued alone and had to pay 24 times the
damages caused by his purchases. See Note, supra note 25, at 904.
If a judge believes that a settlement is unfair to one of the potential parties, he should refuse to
approve the settlement. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974);
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 172 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1975); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 624
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). See generally Fischer, supra note 2, at 1834-36.
35. When there is joint and several liability, a plaintiff may sue any violator he desires for
whatever reason. See note I supra and accompanying text. He may consider the convenience of
suing that violator, strength of the evidence, financial resources of the violator, special relation-
ships, or even anticompetitive reasons, personal resentment, or bad faith. See Note, Supra note 25,
at 905. Thus, it is possible that a plaintiff may release every other defendant for a small portion of
his liability and then proceed against an unfavored defendant for a disproportionate share of the
damages.
36. To deny contribution in settlements without crediting the amount of the settlement to the
judgment award would lead to the massive coercion techniques often found in antitrust situations.
See ABA, REPORT OF THE SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW WITH LEGISLATIvE RECOMMENDATIONS
14 (1979) (majority report) [hereinafter cited as ABA Molumry REPORT]. A plaintiff's attorney
may threaten to sue a smaller company alone for treble damages attributable to the sales of a
much larger defendant. Faced with such a massive liability, a defendant has little choice but to
settle. See id Another technique in the antitrust area is known as "whipsawing," in which law-
yers for class action plaintiffs negotiate a settlement in stages, charging progressively more for
settlement at each stage. Note, supra note 25, at 907.
37. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981); Laventhol, Krek-
stein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3114
(1981); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d
1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Alexan-
der & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Tucker
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,544
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
The first court to hold that contribution was available from the settling defendant was Altman
v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court reasoned that the policies of
deterrence and fairness outweighed the judicial policy favoring settlement. Id at 624-25. The
court further reasoned that it was well settled that an implied right of contribution existed under
§ 10(b) and this right should not be denied to a defendant merely because another party had
settled with the plaintiff. Id at 625. Accordingly, the court refused to approve a contribution bar
contained in the settlement. Id The court clearly indicated, however, that its decision not to
approve the contribution bar was based on its own discretion as to what was equitable on these
facts and not because it lacked jurisdiction to ratify such a provision. Id This same line of
reasoning was expressly adopted three years later in Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F.
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from some commentators, 3  recent securities cases continue to allow
contribution from settling defendants.39
Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1975), in which the court allowed the original nonsettling defendant to
seek contribution from a settling defendant.
In 1978, the court in McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other
grounds. 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979), continued this trend to grant contribution from settling
defendants. The court acknowledged the concern that claims against settling defendants might
deter settlements and might not adequately deter future violations of the nonsettling defendant if
that defendant was sure he could receive contribution in all cases. Id at 1266. The court rea-
soned, however, that these considerations were "overborne by recognition of possible collusion
between settling defendants and plaintiffs and the realization that fundamental fairness demands
a sharing by wrongdoers in setting the wrong right." Id. at 1266.
38. See Adamski, supra note 8; Note, supra note 25.
39. The Ninth Circuit in Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d
672 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3114 (1981), ignored these recent commentators, see
note 38 supra, and refused to dismiss a cross-claim by a remaining nonsettling defendant for
contribution from settling defendants. The court first noted that the securities laws expressly
granted a right of contribution from any party that would have been held jointly and severally
liable at trial, making no distinction between settling and nonsettling parties. Id at 674-75. The
court dismissed the argument that public policy favors settlement, stating that Congress had
clearly expressed its preference when it granted a general right of contribution. Id at 675. The
court further noted that allowing contribution would enhance the deterrence policies of the securi-
ties laws by requiring each violator to pay his proper share of the damages. Id
In 1981, the Fifth Circuit, in Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981),
reversed a district court decision denying contribution from the settling defendants, while lower-
ing the judgment award against the remaining parties by the amount previously received in settle-
ment. Id. at 556. The court reasoned that prohibiting contribution would encourage claims
against numerous defendants in the hope that some would settle to avoid the time and expenses of
litigation. Id at 558. The amount received in settlement would then be used to finance the con-
tinuation of the suit. Id The court noted that the plaintiff could also settle initially for small
amounts, subjecting the remaining parties to an increasingly greater share of the total damages.
Id This would enable the plaintiff to play one defendant against another in order to force the
remaining nonsettling defendants into unfavorable and unjust settlements. Id See also note 27
supra.
The last case to address the issue, In re National Student Marketing Litigation, 517 F. Supp.
1345 (D.D.C. 1981), continued this trend to allow contribution from the settling defendants. Cit-
ing both Laventhol and Huddleston, the court noted that both the securities laws and the federal
rules of civil procedure permitted a nonsettling defendant to enjoin a settling party in order to
receive contribution. Id at 1347-48.
The settling party in this case presented two arguments against the allowance of contribution.
First, the settling party cited Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27
(2d Cir. 1976), in support of its claim that a federal right of contribution does not exist under
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act in settlement cases. 517 F. Supp. at 1347. The court responded, however,
that Herzfeld stood solely for the proposition that a settling party will be liable for contribution
only if the amount he paid in settlement was less than his later determined share of the damages.
id
The settling party also argued that no federal right of contribution exists in the first place, and
thus none could be implied under § 10(b). Id As support for this second defense, the settling
party cited Texas Ind., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981), and Northwest
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B. Avoiding Liabilityfor Contribution
Because liability for contribution will reduce the attractiveness of set-
tlement to a settling defendant, some courts have devised a method to
protect a settling party against future financial losses. Recently, a few
courts have permitted plaintiffs in securities actions to indemnify the
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981). The court, however, stated that the
defendant's reliance on these two cases was misplaced. 517 F. Supp. at 1346-47. The court noted
that the Texas Industries case dealt with the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), while the Northwest Airlnes case dealt with the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1976). 517 F. Supp. at 1349. Thus, the securities statutes are to be distinguished because Con-
gress has expressly provided for contribution among joint violators of the securities laws. Id See
notes 17-23 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, because federal cases have consistently rec-
ognized the implied right of contribution under the securities laws and the Supreme Court has not
yet restricted this trend, the court recognized a federal right of contribution in settlement cases
under the securities laws. 517 F. Supp. at 1349. See also notes 15-31 supra and accompanying
text.
There is some other authority in federal securities cases that a settling party may be absolved
from contribution. In State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., 49 F.R.D.
202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court denied contribution from a settling defendant because a joint judg-
ment had not been entered against him in the original action. Id at 212. This decision, however,
was based on state law and the lack of an implied private right of action under § 10(b). Id
Because it is now uniformly recognized that federal law governs in the securities area and that
there is an implied right of contribution under the securities laws, this case has little precedential
value. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
The court in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976),
also denied a claim for contribution from settling defendants on the grounds that the settling party
had already paid more than his proportionate share. Id at 39. This rationale has been criticized
because the settling party will never be sure of potential liability until the judgment is final.
Adamski, supra note 8, at 546; Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, supra note 25, at 812-13. Herzfeld
provides little comfort to a defendant considering a partial settlement, because there is no way to
predetermine what the court will ultimately establish as his proportionate share of the damages.
Thus, the settling party will never be certain of his liability for contribution until the court deter-
mines his ultimate liability. See also Adamski, supra note 8, at 546.
Under Herzfeld, the nonsettling defendant is in a very advantageous position. If the settling
party settles for less than his pro rata share, the nonsettling party can cross-claim for contribution
of the difference. However, if the settling party settles for more than his pro rata share, the nonset-
tling party will receive the benefit of his bargain because the settlement payment will reduce the
judgment award in a like amount, resulting in a payment by the nonsettling party of less than his
pro rata share.
For these reasons, subsequent courts have recognized that Herzfeld is a limited exception, ap-
plying only when the settling party has paid more than his later determined liability. See
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3114 (1981); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.,
594 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979); In re National Student Marketing Litigation, 517 F. Supp.
1345, 1347 (D.D.C. 1981). See generally Adamnski, supra note 8, at 545-46.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/8
Number 1] CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
settling party against liability for future contribution claims. 40
The operation of this type of indemnity agreement is best illustrated
by the following hypothetical example. Plaintiff brings a suit against
two defendants for $100,000. Defendant X settles for $25,000 and
plaintiff releases that defendant from the suit, promising to indemnify
X against any future claims arising out of the suit. The court subse-
quently finds defendant Y liable for a $75,000 judgment.41 y in turn
sues42 defendant X for contribution in the amount of $25,000. 41
Defendant X is then entitled to collect this $25,000 from the plaintiff
through their indemnity contract.
The first case to uphold the validity of such an agreement was Mc-
Lean v. Alexander.' Although the court acknowledged that indemnifi-
cation agreements between intentional wrongdoers are void as against
public policy, 45 the court noted that indemnification agreements be-
tween plaintiff and defendant were not subject to the same public pol-
icy considerations.46 This type of indemnification agreement does not
40. In re National Student Marketing Litigation, 517 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (D.D.C. 1981);
Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 272, 277 (D. Kan. 1978); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.
Supp. 1251, 1266 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). See gener-
ally Adamski, supra note 8, at 546-47.
41. The amount is $100,000 in damages less the $25,000 plaintiff has received from the settle-
ment. See note 27 supra.
42. It is also possible for the nonsettling party to join the settling party in the original action
instead of bringing a separate suit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) & (I). Such a motion also would be
beneficial to the settling party because he could cross-claim against the plaintiff to enforce his
indemnity claim and therefore eliminate the necessity of bringing a separate suit for enforcement
of the indemnification contract. See id
43. X's $50,000 proportionate share less $25,000 paid in settlement. See note 39 supra. Both
the settling and nonsettling defendants benefit if the nonsettling defendant joins the settling de-
fendant in the original action. This precludes the need for a separate suit, while forcing the plain-
tiff to indemnify the settling party immediately for any amount owed in contribution. See
McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1267-68 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don othergrounds, 559 F.2d
1190 (3d Cir. 1979). This will have the same effect as if the nonsettling defendant obtained contri-
bution to pay the gross award and the plaintiff, in turn, indemnified the settling party for the
amount he paid in contribution.
44. 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.
1979).
45. Id The court did recognize that there is some authority holding that indemnification
contracts may be enforced if the one seeking indemnification is not as culpable as the other party.
Id (citing Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Carpenter v. Hall,
311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970)). Uncertainty remains as to whether all indemnification con-
tracts or just those involving intentional wrongdoers are void as against public policy. See note 4
supra.
46. 449 F. Supp. at 1266. The court distinguished indemnification contracts between defend-
ants from those between plaintiff and defendant. First, the plaintiff has the free choice to sue any
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allow a party to escape liability altogether. Rather, it forces the settling
defendant to pay an amount that the plaintiff believes is adequate com-
pensation for the harm caused by that defendant.47 Thus the deterrent
policies of the securities laws are not undercut.
Although indemnification contracts may lessen the impact of contri-
bution on settling defendants, the settling party may still have to de-
fend itself from the nonsettling party's claim for contribution.48 In In re
National Student Marketing Litigation,49 the court refused to dismiss a
nonsettling party's cross-claim for contribution against a settling de-
fendant who had previously entered into an indemnity agreement with
the plaintiff5 0 The court noted that the agreement did not and could
not affect the rights of any of the nonsettling defendants."' Thus, the
court forced the settling defendant to defend itself against the contribu-
tion claim, even though the plaintiff would indemnify the settling de-
fendant for any contribution judgments the court levied.-,
Outside the securities context, some authorities completely deny con-
tribution from the settling defendant. In Gomes v. Brodhurst,53 a tort
action, the plaintiff entered into a settlement with a defendant one week
before trial. 4 To promote settlement, the court denied contribution
from the settling party." The court was concerned, however, that the
plaintiff might release a favored defendant for a disproportionately low
amount in order to force the remaining defendants to pay an amount
greatly in excess of their proportionate share.5 6 To prevent this poten-
party he desires. Second, if a plaintiff wants to reduce his claim or indemnify a defendant in order
to promote a settlement, such a decision should be fully enforced. Id
47. See id at 1266-67.
48. See In re National Student Marketing Litigation, 517 F. Supp. 1345 (D.D.C. 1981); Mc-
Lean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d
Cir. 1979).
49. 517 F. Supp. 1345 (D.D.C. 1981).
50. Id 1347-49. See also McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1267 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
51. 517 F. Supp. at 1347-49.
52. Id at 1349. See also McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1267 (D. Del. 1978), rep'd
on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
53. 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967).
54. Id at 466.
55. Id at 468. The court looked for a solution that would further the policy consideration of
"the encouragement of voluntary settlements, the equitable distribution of liability among joint
tortfeasors, and the elimination or minimization of collusion." Id at 467. The court reasoned
that to allow contribution would be to encourage all defendants to stand trial to minimize their
losses. Id at 468.
56. Id If the judgment were merely reduced by the amount of the settlement, the plaintiff
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tial injustice to the nonsettling parties, the court reduced the plaintiffs
recovery by the amount of damages caused by the settling defendant.57
This approach has also found some limited acceptance in the legisla-
tive area. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act5" advocates denial of
contribution from a defendant settling in good faith, with reduction of
the judgment award by the greater of either the settlement amount or
the relative fault of the settling party.59 A bill proposed by the Anti-
could settle with favored defendants for nominal amounts and thereby free the settling defendants
from any future liability. The plaintiff would still receive full compensation for his injury but
primarily at the expense of the nonsettling defendants, who may be forced to pay an amount
greatly in excess of their proportionate shares of the damages.
57. Id at 469. For example, if A, B, and C were all equally culpable in causing D's injury
and D settled with both A and B, the judgment award would be reduced by two-thirds, regardless
of the amount D settled for with A and B. Thus C will only have to pay one-third the original
judgment, the same amount he would have had to pay if A and B had not settled. This will
promote good faith settlements because the plaintiff will realize that he will permanently lose the
difference between the settlement award and the settling party's proportionate share of the
damages.
58. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 6 (1977) states:
A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a
person liable discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does not
discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However,
the claim of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the
released person's equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2.
59. Id § 6. In 1955, the Uniform Commission on State Laws recommended that contribu-
tion be denied, and urged instead that the judgment award be reduced only by the settlement
amount. UNIFORM CONTRIBuTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4 (1955) provides:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good
faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrong-
ful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to
the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of
the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater;, and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution
to any other tortfeasor.
While this was an improvement over the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,
which permitted contribution from the settling defendant, this Act still allowed the plaintiff to
release favored defendants for nominal sums because the remainder of the award would be recov-
ered in full from the remaining defendants. See, ag., Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d
Cir. 1967).
The 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 6 was a response to the problem. See UNIFORM
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, Commissioners' Comment (1977). Under this position, the set-
tling defendant is able to settle and avoid all future litigation, while the nonsettling defendant's
liability is reduced by at least the amount the settling party would have been liable for in contribu-
tion. However, this position forces the plaintiff to assume the risk that the defendant may settle
for an amount less than his proportionate fault, while denying plaintiff the benefit of the bargain if
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trust Section of the American Bar Association (ABA bill)6" would also
deny contribution from the settling defendant,6' and correspondingly
lower the judgment award assessed against the nonsettling defendant
by the settling party's proportionate share of the damages.62 Both ap-
proaches signify the growing reluctance to reduce judgment awards
merely by the settlement amount. 3
C. Analysis
Indemnification contracts between the plaintiff and the settling par-
he settles for an amount greater than the defendant's proportionate fault. This may deter a plain-
tiff's incentive to settle.
60. ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 36, at 9-12.
61. Id at 8-9. Because the proposed legislation would ensure that a settling defendant is free
from contribution, settlement by that defendant will be encouraged. See Id
62. Id at 11. This bill would allow the plaintiff the option whether to elect to withdraw the
claims based upon the acts of the settling defendant or to permit the court to reduce the judgment
by the amount for which the settling party would have been liable at trial. Id The Report noted
that this provision was essential in order to make a contribution statute work properly. Id at 14.
This approach protects the nonsettling defendant from increasing liability and collusion between
the plaintiff and settling defendant while it provides the plaintiff the needed certainty required to
get the class settlement approved. Id at 14-15.
Another bill recently introduced in Congress also would deny contribution from settling de-
fendants in antitrust matters. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill, proposed by Senator
Bayh, would reduce the plaintiff's claim by the greatest of the amount stipulated by the release,
the consideration paid for the release, or the amount of damages attributable to the settling party's
shares or purchases. Id § 41(b).
63. An additional problem may arise when a party settles for more than his later determined
proportionate share. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 38-
39 (2d Cir. 1976). The question then is whether the settling defendant can seek contribution from
the nonsettling defendants who actually incurred less than their proportionate share, if the judg-
ment award was reduced by the higher settlement amount. Both the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886A(2) (1978) and the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § l(d)
(1955) hold that contribution only lies in favor of a tortfeasor who discharges the entire claim of a
joint tortfeasor and thus refuses such a contribution claim.
Although no case directly addresses this issue, some authority suggests that the result may be
different in the securities area. In Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D.
DeL 1974), vacatedon other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976), the third-party defendants, who
had previously settled, cross-claimed against the original defendants for contribution on a bene-
fits-derived theory. Id at 171. The settling parties argued that because they received no benefits
from the transaction, they should recover full contribution from the original defendants who had
derived all of the benefits of the illegal sale. Id The court rejected this cross-claim, but did so
because the settling parties did not prove that the nonsettling parties were jointly liable for the
injury on which the entitlement was based. Id at 171-72. Apparently, the Gould court would
have allowed contribution by a settling party, if the settlement claim and the claim at trial were
identical. Accord, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 82 (1937).
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ties have beneficial aspects.' These contracts further the deterrence
policies of the securities laws by requiring each of the culpable parties
to bear a portion of the total damages. 65 These contracts also tend to
promote settlement because they absolve the settling defendant from
future financial losses.66 Finally, indemnification contracts promote
good faith settlements because the plaintiff may be forced to pay back
any difference between the settlement amount and the amount the
court ultimately decides is that settling party's proportionate share of
the damages.67
These contracts are not, however, the most efficient means of both
simultaneously promoting settlements and equitably apportioning
losses among the parties. First, because the number of cases involving
these agreements is small, settling parties may not be aware of the pos-
sibility for such agreements.68 Second, some uncertainty exists as to
whether the courts will uphold such agreements. 69 Third, the settling
party still may have to incur the time and expense of litigation in de-
fending itself against contribution claims.70 Finally, the settling de-
fendant may have to sue to enforce the indemnity agreement.71
Courts should adopt an approach that both encourages settlements
and remains consistent with the deterrence and fairness policies of the
securities laws.72 The most efficient approach is to absolve the settling
party from contribution and then reduce the judgment award against
the remaining nonsettling parties by the settling party's proportionate
share of the damages.73 Such a method eliminates two steps involved
in enforcing indemnity contracts.74 This result reduces securities litiga-
tion and correspondingly increases judicial expediency. In addition, it
frees the settling party from the time and monetary expenses of trial.75
64. These contracts are to be distinguished from indemnification contracts between violators
of the securities laws. The latter are discussed at note 4 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 40-52 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. See also Adamsi, supra note 8, at 547.
69. See Adamski, supra note 8.
70. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
72. See notes 28-36 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
75. The settling party would still have to participate in the litigation, but only as a witness to
help determine what his proportionate share of the damages would have been in order to deter-
Washington University Open Scholarship
230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:211
Reducing the judgment award by the settling party's proportionate
share of the damages is preferable to merely reducing the award by the
proceeds obtained in settlement.76 Reducing the award by the settling
party's proportionate share of the damages will diminish a plaintiff's
desire to settle because he can potentially lose the difference between
the settling party's actual share of the damages and the amount of the
settlement.77 Reducing the award merely by the settlement amount,
however, will invite collusion and coercion between the settling party
and the plaintiff. To reduce the judgment only by the settlement
amount will enable a plaintiff to release favored defendants for unrea-
sonably low amounts knowing that he still can collect the remaining
amount of damages from the nonsettling defendant at trial.78  This
method is subject to further criticism because it enables a plaintiff who
has settled with one defendant to pressure the other defendants into
unfavorable settlements. These nonsettling defendants may be forced
to elect settlement rather than risk having to pay a damage award at
trial that greatly exceeds their proportionate shares of the damages.7 9
mine by how much the judgment award should be reduced. The adversarial nature of the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and nonsettling defendants should be enough to thwart any possible
collusion between the settling defendant and one of the other defendants, Ze., the nonsettling
defendant would want the settling defendant to exaggerate his share of the damages in order to
reduce the ultimate judgment, while the plaintiff would want the settling defendant to understate
his share of the damages in order to increase his ultimate judgment against the nonsettling defend-
ant. Finally, because the nonsettling defendant would have had the burden of showing the set-
tling party's proportionate share if he initiated a contribution claim against him, the nonsettling
party should also bear the burden of proof to show how much the judgment should be reduced if
contribution is denied.
76. To reduce the judgment award by the settling party's proportionate share is also prefera-
ble to reducing the judgment by the greater of the settlement proceeds or the settling party's pro-
portionate share. The latter approach forces the plaintiff to assume the risk that the defendant
may settle for an amount less than his proportionate share, while denying a plaintiff the benefit of
a bargain if he settles for an amount greater than the defendant's proportionate fault. See notes
27, 59 & 62 supra. One of the primary goals of the securities laws is deterrence. See note 19 supra
and accompanying text. Thus, a nonsettling defendant who violates the securities laws should
never get the benefit of a bargain over an injured plaintiff, the very person the securities laws were
designed to protect.
77. For example, suppose A brought a suit against B and C for $100 total in damages, A and
B each being liable for $50 of the damages. IfA settled with B for only $25, he would receive only
$75 in total damages: $25 from B, plus a $50 judgment from C because the judgment against C
would have been reduced by B's share of the damages.
78. See notes 38 & 57 supra and accompanying text. For example, suppose A sues B and C
for $100,000. If the award were merely reduced by the settlement amount, A could settle with B
for $1,000. This would reduce the judgment against C by only $1,000 and make him liable for
$99,000.
79. A could threaten to settle with B for $1,000 and thereby subject C to a potential liability
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Denying contribution from the settling defendants while reducing
the judgment by the settling defendant's proportionate share of the
damages properly balances the two competing objectives that arise in
contribution cases. This approach promotes settlements because the
settling party is absolved from the time, expense, and liability of future
litigation. Each defendant is required to pay a share of the damages,
thereby promoting the deterrence policies of the Securities Acts. Good
faith settlements result because the plaintiff is compelled to settle for an
amount equal to the settling party's share of the damages. Finally, re-
ducing the award by the settling party's proportionate share of the
damages limits the nonsettling party's liability to his proportionate
share of the damages. The result under this approach, for the nonset-
fling party, is the same as if contribution were allowed.
III. METHODS OF ALLOCATING JUDGMENT AWARDs
The equitable allocation of the judgment award"° among the several
defendants is an important aspect of contribution analysis.8' There are
three primary methods used in apportioning the judgment award: pro
rata, benefits-derived, and comparative fault.8 2
A. Pro Rata
The traditional method for apportioning damages among joint
of $99,000 even though he only caused $50,000 of the damages. Thus, there would be great pres-
sure on C to settle even if the settlement was unfavorable and the case against him weak. See note
59 supra and accompanying text.
80. To determine the defendant's proportionate share, the court must first begin with a com-
putation of the actual damages. Damages are traditionally calculated on the basis of out-of-pock-
et costs measured by the difference between the stock's value and the amount actually paid.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). A wrongdoer is generally liable for
all damages that result from his wrong. Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 802 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). See generaI Mullaney, supra note 23; Ruder, Measuring
Buyers' Damages in lOb-5 Cases, 31 Bus. LAW. 1839 (1976).
81. In order to determine each party's proportionate share of the damages, a court must first
determine the number of parties from whom contribution to a judgment will be required. For a
discussion of this issue, see Adamski, supra note 8, at 554-62; Fischer, supra note 2, at 1836-40.
82. It is important to note here that whether contribution is based upon findings of compara-
tive fault, a pro rata formula, or on the basis of benefits received, the plaintiffs right to proceed
against any one of the defendants for satisfaction in full remains undisturbed. Rather, these meth-
ods are used only to determine the amount the paying party may recover from the other parties.
Lentz v. Freeman Assoc. Caribbean, 441 F. Supp. 892, 895 (D.V.I. 1977). See RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 81, comment b (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 886A (1977).
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tortfeasors is to require each tortfeasor to pay a pro rata share. 3 This
share is determined simply by dividing the total judgment award by the
number of liable parties. Each of these parties thus pays an equal
share.84
Early commentators generally accepted the pro rata rule as "the only
workable rule to apply."85 These commentators preferred the pro rata
approach for three main reasons.8 6 First, early legal scholars adhered
to the traditional notion that "equality is equity."8" Second, because
the rule is reasonably clear and definite, it fosters administrative ease
and convenience. 88 Finally, courts and authors construed the phrase
"as in cases of contract," which is found in the express provisions of the
Securities Acts governing contribution,89 to imply a preference for the
pro rata method as used in pre-Securities Acts contract cases.90
83. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 38-39 (2d Cir.
1976); Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370-71 (D. Md. 1975), aft, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th
Cir. 1976); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 310; Fischer, supra note 2, at 1829; Ruder, supra
note 3, at 650; Note, supra note 8, at 1304.
84. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 310; RESTATEMENT OF RasTtrrION §§ 81, 85
(1937).
85. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 179-80 (1933)
state:
The only workable rule to apply to this residual group is the one of pro rata contribution
according to the rules of law and equity .... On the whole, judged by administrative
expediency, this is probably as simple and satisfactory a way to handle the matter as any.
To resort to fault, compensation, or extent of participation would be even more
confusing.
See 3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1738 (citing Douglas & Bates with approval); Ruder, supra note 3,
at 650 n.239 (pro rata method is easier to administer).
86. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 1829.
87. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 310. See Bohlen, supra note 22, at 557-69; Gregory,
Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Un/form Practice, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 365, 372; Leflar, supra
note 2, at 136; Turck, supra note 2, at 20.
88. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1182 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979); Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370-71 (D. Md. 1975), a'd, 542
F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 310; Fischer, supra
note 2, at 1829.
89. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Ruder, supra note 3, at 650-51. In determining which method is appropriate, Dean
Ruder states:
The phrase "as in cases of contract" also aids in answering the question: "According
to what method is the contribution to be allowed?" Theoretically contribution could be
required either on a pro-rata basis or on some basis involving a degree of fault analysis.
Since the Securities Acts incorporate the contract standard for contribution between
tortfeasors, the pro-rata method used in common law contract cases should apply.
Id
The legislative history of the act provides no assistance in this determination. See S. REP. No.
47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); H.R. REP. No. 152,
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The pro rata method originated in the context of business contract
cases.9' This approach led to an equitable result in these cases because
normally all the parties who signed, or were a party to, the contract
were equally at fault.92 In contrast to these early business contract
cases, however, the federal securities laws subject a much broader and
more diverse group of parties to liability.93 As a result of this diverse
exposure, the degree of fault among various securities violators is not
necessarily equal.94 The pro rata method thus has begun to lose its
longstanding preferred status.95
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Doc. No. 185, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
91. See W. PROSSE, supra note 1, § 50, at 310; Ruder, supra note 3, at 650; Note, supra note
5, at 1304.
92. The three major situations in which the business contract cases arose were all suited for
equal contribution shares: (1) a director presumably acted with the consent of all the other direc-
tors when signing a contract later held to be ultra vires and therefore equal liability was appropri-
ate; (2) normally each party in surety cases was equally culpable and therefore equal shares of
contribution produced an equitable result; and (3) when the contract in a joint undertaking was
for the benefit of all the parties, equal contribution was proper. Note, supra note 5, at 1304 n.272.
93. See, ag., Securities Act of 1933 § I I(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976), which subjects any of
the following persons to liability if a registration statement is misleading:
(I) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or
partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement with
respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as
being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or partner,
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives
authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as having
prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or
certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration state-
ment, with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation,
which purports to have been prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (imposes liability on
any person who employs any manipulation or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security).
94. In addition, the courts have construed these acts as imposing different standards of liabil-
ity for different classes of defendants. See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), and Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), which impose different standards of due diligence under § 11 of the Act.
95. Starting in the early 1970s, the federal courts began recognizing the existence of other
methods of apportionment. The court in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), without discussing the concept of comparative fault, allowed the less
culpable parties to pay significantly lesser amounts. Then in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), a inpart and rev'd in part, 540
F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976), the court first considered comparative fault before adopting a pro rata
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B. Benets-Derived
The first decision to depart expressly from the pro rata method was
Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. 9 6 In Gould the nonsettling
defendants,97 held liable under Section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, were forced to disgorge twenty-five percent of the premi-
ums they received in a merger.98 These nonsettling defendants then
sought contribution on a pro rata basis from the settling defendants.99
The Gould court rejected the contention that the phrase "as in cases
of contract" in the Securities Acts means that the pro rata method is
required in contribution cases arising under the securities laws.I°° Al-
though the legislative history is silent concerning this issue, the court
stated that Congress inserted this phrase only to avoid the common-law
restriction against contribution. 10' The Gould court reasoned that
when a party seeking contribution is held liable on a disgorgement
principle, that party may seek contribution from the other parties only
on a benefits-derived theory.'0 2 Allowing contribution on a pro rata
basis may allow the nonsettling defendants to retain some of the bene-
approach. The court justified its use of the pro rata method not only on administrative ease and
convenience grounds, but also because the parties were equally culpable and comparative fault
would have led to the same result. Id at 136.
Although the court in Herzfeld cited Globus as support for the principle that the pro rata
method is applicable for use in securities actions, it should be noted that the parties in Globus were
also found equally culpable, and thus a comparative fault allocation would have led to the same
result. See Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), qft'd,
442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
96. 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacatedon other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). In
Gould, the federal court was presented with three classes of defendants arguing for three different
methods of contribution: pro rata, benefits-derived, and comparative negligence. Id at 169-70.
97. Although the original defendants include two companies, ten directors, and five share-
holders, Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 984 (D. Del. 1971), after settle.
ments, only the liability of two shareholders remained at issue. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 362 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. Del. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
98. 362 F. Supp. at 778. The court held that the proxies solicited by the defendants for share-
holder approval of a proposed merger were materially misleading in violation of Securities Ex.
change Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). 362 F. Supp. at 774-75. Therefore, the
court forced the nonsettling shareholders to disgorge that portion of the share price which was in
excess of the actual market value. Id at 775-76.
99. 387 F. Supp. at 169-70.
100. Id at 170. See also notes 90-94 supra and accompanying text.
101. 387 F. Supp. at 170.
102. Id. at 171. The court noted that even if the pro rata method was generally used in securi-
ties cases, under these circumstances it would lead to an inequitable result. It would be inequita-
ble to force the settling defendants to reimburse the nonsettling defendants for their disgorgement
of benefits they illegally received. Id at 170-71.
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fits of their violation and thus would not adequately deter future
violations. 0 3
The court refused, however, to endorse fully the benefits-derived the-
ory. The court denied contribution claims from the settling defendants
who had received no economic benefits from their violations."° Al-
lowing such a claim would have amounted to the full indemnification
of a securities laws violator. 05 This result would conffict with one ra-
tionale of contribution that requires all defendants to share the
financial burdens caused by their actions in order to deter future viola-
tions.t11 Thus, subsequent courts have refused to use a benefits-derived
allocation when the party seeking contribution received no economic
benefits from the violation. Basing contribution on a benefits-derived
theory would completely indemnify any defendant who derived no eco-
nomic gain from an illegal act.' 7
C. Comparative Fault
Courts may also allocate damages among joint tortfeasors on a com-
parative fault basis. This method apportions damages based on each
party's relative culpability or responsibility for the illegal act.'08
The trend in areas of law other than securities is to adopt compara-
tive fault contribution."° United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., I" a
103. Id. at 171. A pro rata allocation would lead to an inequitable result when a party's pro
rata share was less than the benefits he derived from the violation. Such a result would reward a
party for violating the securities laws and thus defeat the deterrence policies of the Acts. See id
Cf Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995, at 79,704 (10th
Cir.) (antitrust case in which court in dictum proposed a comparative benefit analysis whereby the
defendant is required to accept that share of the judgment that reflects the profits he received as a
result of the violation); ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 36, at 3 (recognizes market share as a
viable alternative).
104. 387 F. Supp. at 171.
105. Id Using the benefits derived from the violation as the measure of liability is improper
because any party who received no economic benefits would be absolved from contribution.
106. Id See also notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
107. See Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1278 (E.D. La. 1979); McLean v. Alexan-
der, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266-67 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.
1979); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
108. See McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1274 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other grounds,
599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1724()(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1978);
Adamski, supra note 8, at 555; Fischer, supra note 2, at 1829; Freund & Hacker, supra note 4, at
472; Note, supra note 4, at 98-100; Note, supra note 5, at 1308.
109. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (comparative fault recog-
nized in admiralty collision cases); UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT (proposes comparative
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recent United States Supreme Court admiralty decision, provides valu-
able insight regarding the Court's view on apportioning damages. The
Court refused to use the traditional pro rata approach, noting that the
United States was virtually alone among the world's maritime nations
in using this formula in applying damages.1 1  Such a lack of uniform-
ity was certain to cause forum shopping.'1 2 In repudiating the pro rata
method, the Court stated that this rule produces a satisfactory result
only when each party is nearly equal in fault and thus would assume a
share of the damage in true proportion to their degree of fault.1 1 3 The
Court dismissed the argument that the ease and expediency of the pro-
rata rule would serve to promote judicial economy 114 and settle-
ments, 1 5 declaring that convenience in application could never justify
fault in state tort area); ABA MAjoRrTy REPORT, supra note 36, (proposes comparative fault in
antitrust area).
110. 421 U.S. 397 (1975). In this case, a ship owner sought contribution from the United
States for the damages that resulted when his ship ran aground. Id at 398-99. The lower court
found that the grounding was caused 25% by the failure of the Coast Guard to maintain a break-
water light and 75% by the fault of the ship's crew. Id at 399. The lower court refused to depart
from the taditional pro rata method, however, and required the parties to share the damages
equally. Id at 400.
111. Id at 403-04.
112. Id Likewise, a lack ofuniformity in the federal securities area will promote forum shop-
ping. If the original defendant is smaller and less culpable than the other joint violators, he may
maintain a separate action for contribution in a district where the judge favors comparative fault;
whereas if he is more culpable than the other parties, he will try to sue in a district that favors pro
rata. Compare McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978) (Delaware federal court
stated preference for comparative fault), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) with
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (South-
ern District of New York has favored pro rata method), af'din part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27
(2d Cir. 1976) and Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(same), afd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
113. 421 U.S. at 405.
114. 421 U.S. at 407. Although the Court realized that the argument favoring a pro rata allo-
cation because of its ease and certainty had merit, the Court stated that it has no force in those
cases in which the degree of culpability can be determined without difficulty. Id If it is impossi-
ble or too problematic to allocate degrees of fault among the parties in a particular case, then the
pro rata rule is an appropriate and equitable remedy. ld But "potential problems of proof in
some cases hardly requires adherence to an unfair and archaic rule in all cases." Id
115. Id at 408. The Court noted that settlements according to perceived relative fault will still
benefit both parties by avoiding the time and expense of litigation. Id Furthermore, the Court
stated that "experience with comparative fault in the personal injury area teaches us that a rule of
fairness in the court will produce fair out-of-court settlements." Id Even if the argument had
more merit, the Supreme Court would have rejected it because "congestion in the courts cannot
justify a legal rule that produces unjust results in litigation simply to encourage out-of-court con-
siderations." Id
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inequitable results. 1 6 Finally, the Court stated that a method that im-
poses greater liability on the more culpable party would serve as a
greater deterrent. 1
7
Comparative fault has also received some consideration in the legis-
lative area. The proposed Federal Securities Code"' provides that
contribution should be determined by considering the relative responsi-
bility of each of the parties for the loss incurred." 9 In addition, two
bills recently proposed in Congress favor a federal right to contribution
in the antitrust area and also advocate a comparative fault approach.'
2 0
116. Id
117. Id at 405 n. 11. The Court stated:
It is difficult to imagine any manner in which the divided damages rule would be more
likely to "induce care and vigilance" than a comparative negligence rule that also penal-
izes wrongdoing, but in proportion to measure of fault. A rule that divides damages by
degree of fault would seem better designed to induce care than the rule of equally di-
vided damages, because it imposes the strongest deterrent upon the wrongful behavior
that is most likely to harm others.
Id
118. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
119. Id § 1724(f(2). The Code provides that
to the extent that there is no such contract, and on consideration of the relative responsi-
bility of each party for the loss incurred, the judgment in an action for contribution may
(A) order any such person to pay to any other such person as much as is determined to
be just and equitable by way of contribution, (B) order that the contribution of any such
person amount to a complete indemnity, or (C) determine that any such person is not
liable for contribution, but no such person may be ordered to pay more under section
1724(0 than his maximum liability if he had been a defendant in the action giving rise to
an action for contribution.
id
120. A bill by Senator Bayh would allocate damages in an antitrust contribution case accord-
ing to the damages which are attributable to each party's actions. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). See note 62 supra.
In reaction to the Bayh bill, the ABA proposed an approach that measured contribution accord-
ing to the relative responsibility of each party. See ABA MAJORiTY REPORT, supra note 36, at 11.
The ABA proposal is more flexible because it looks to impact as well as culpability. Whereas the
Bayh bill looks only to the damages directly attributable to a sale or purchase, the ABA method
looks further to the extent of the violation, the transactions affected, and the relative culpabilities
of the parties. Id at 15.
The ABA approach is preferable in the securities area in which damages are seldom attributable
to distinct parties. Instead, in a securities violation, a number of parties will jointly participate in
one activity that violates the securities laws. See, eg., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (imposes liability on every person involved in any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance to injure the investing public); Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(k) (1976) (imposes liability on every person who signed or was in any way connected with a
registration statement that contained an untrue statement).
An allocation based solely on "responsibility" for the violation would result in the imposition of
great burdens on the issuer and insiders to the benefit of underwriters and other outsiders because
the insider would be closer to the facts and the one responsible for initiating the fraud. See Note,
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This trend toward comparative fault analysis is beginning to influ-
ence federal securities litigation at the district court level. 121 In Felt v.
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. ,122 the court, without discuss-
ing the concept of comparative fault, forced the more culpable parties
to pay significantly greater amounts of damages than their pro rata
share. 23 Then, the courts in both Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steam-
shp Co. 124 and Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath 121
identified comparative fault as one equitable method of apportioning
damages, but declined to apply it. Finally, in 1978, the court in Mc-
Lean v. Alexander1 26 adopted a comparative fault approach to appor-
tion damages in a securities case.
In McLean, an accounting firm was sued by investors who detrimen-
supra note 4, at 100. Therefore, factors such as culpability, motive, and the extent and duration of
the violation should be considered to produce an amount that will serve to deter future securities
violations.
121. See McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978) (adopting comparative
fault), rev'd on other grounds 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). Compare ALI FED. SeC. CODE
§ 1724(f) (Proposed Official Draft 1978) (Loss now advocates comparative fault) with L. Loss,
supra note 4, at 1738 ("only workable rule to apply is pro rata").
122. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
123. Note, supra note 4, at 90. Following judgment against the corporation and three of its
directors for violating § 11 of the 1933 Act, the company sought approval to pay the entire judg-
ment without contribution from its directors. Id at 89. The SEC intervened on the grounds that
such a payment would amount to indemnification of the directors and would thus violate public
policy. Id (citing Brief for SEC as Intervenor, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)). See also note 4supra and accompanying text. The court, without
discussion, approved the payment of only $5,000 by each of the three directors, leaving the corpo-
ration to pay more than $300,000. Note, supra note 4, at 89. Whether the court was attempting to
apportion damages according to financial ability to pay or comparative fault is not certain. It is
clear, however, that the court refused to apply a pro rata allocation under these circumstances.
By requiring the directors to contribute nominal sums to the corporation, this case also seems to
stand for the proposition that the Securities Acts not only grant a right to contribution, but also
impose a duty on corporations to seek contribution from their directors and employees when it is
necessary to avoid their complete indemnification. See 17 C.F.R. § 430.460 (1980) (it is the opin-
ion of the Securities and Exchange Commission that indemnification contracts between directors
and issuers are against public policy).
124. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 170-71 (D. Del. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
125. 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afd in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1976). After being held liable in a § 10(b) action, an accounting firm sought contribution from an
underwriter who had knowledge of the misleading nature of the financial report. Id at 134. The
underwriter was held liable for contribution because one of its officers had knowledge of the
misleading nature of the financial report. Id The court found that the underwriter had a duty
along with the auditors to reveal all the material facts needed by the investors to make a knowl-
edgeable decision. Id
126. 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
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tally relied upon a misleading financial report. 127 Seeking contribution
from four selling shareholders, the accounting firm argued that the
court should evenly apportion the damages among the five parties. 2 '
The court was troubled, however, because a pro rata approach would
not take into consideration the vast differences in culpability between
the accounting firm and the prior shareholders. 129
The court focused its attention on devising an allocation method that
would reflect this difference in culpability. Although the McLean court
realized that no prior court had used a comparative fault approach in a
securities action, 3 ' it noted that a few recent commentators had sug-
gested this alternative approach in the securities area.' 3' Impressed
127. Id at 1255. The plaintiff alleged that these misleading financial reports caused him to
buy the stock of Tecbnidyne, Inc. at an inflated price. Id
128. Id at 1272. Because the selling shareholders had both promoted the selling of the stock
to the plaintiff and had intentionally given the accountant misleading information, the court held
that all five parties were jointly and severally liable. Id at 1267. The accounting firm argued that
damages should be awarded on a "head count" basis whereby the four selling shareholders and
the accountant in the firm would each pay 20%. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 38 (2d Cir. 1976) (adopted head count approach, simply dividing the
amount of damages by the number of culpable parties). The court acknowledged that the "entity
theory" had been well received in the federal courts, and grouped the prior shareholders as one
"entity" due to their collective efforts in fraudulently promoting the sale of stock. 449 F. Supp. at
1272. The court expressed concern, however, about the vast difference in culpability between the
shareholders and the accounting firm. Id Therefore, in order to avoid the inequity that would
have resulted if the damages would have been equally divided between the "entity" and the ac-
counting firm, the court used a comparative fault apportionment. This case demonstrates the need
for a comparative fault allocation to prevent the inequities that may result when a pro rata alloca-
tion is used simultaneously with the "entity" approach. Culpable parties often work collectively
in order to defraud the investing public. If these parties rely on another party's negligence or
recklessness to further their fraudulent scheme, it would be unjust to force that one negligent party
to bear the same amount of damages as the entity bears in its entirety. Indeed, such a result would
encourage culpable parties to act collectively. Thus, a comparative fault approach, which would
deter such collective action in the future, should be adopted in those cases which impose a suffi-
ciently large burden on the more culpable parties.
129. 449 F. Supp. at 1272. The accountant was found guilty of merely performing a negligent
audit. The prior shareholders, however, had intentionally created and concealed the fraud from
the accountant in order to defraud its investors. Id A pro rata apportionment between the entity
would have required each of these shareholders to pay only 12.5% of the damages, while the
accountant would have been liable for 50% of the damages. Thus, even though the accountant
was less culpable than any of the prior shareholders, he would have had to pay four times as
much.
130. Id at 1274. But see notes 121-25 supra and accompanying text.
131. 449 F. Supp. at 1274. See ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(f) (Proposed Official Draft 1978);
Adamski, supra note 8, at 557-62; Fischer, supra note 2, at 1829-30; Freund & Hacker, supra note
4, at 472; Note, supra note 4, at 98-100; Note, supra note 8, at 1308.
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with the recent state trend toward adopting comparative fault 132 and a
recent United States Supreme Court admiralty decision that adopted
this method, 133 the McLean court stated that it could find no reason not
to adopt a comparative fault allocation. 134
132. This trend is reflected by the changes in position of the Uniform Commission on State
Laws. In 1939, the Commission proposed the UNIFORM CONTRIBUrION AMONG TORTFEASORS
AcT § 2 (1939), which adopted a relative fault measure in those situations in which an equal
distribution of damages would otherwise lead to an inequitable result. In 1955, the Commission
rejected this position and proposed that contribution be applied strictly on a pro rata basis. UNI-
FORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 2 (1955).
The Commission rejected comparative fault in the 1955 Act because the Act already excluded
intentional, willful, and wanton actions from the right to seek contribution. See Id § 1(c). The
Commission believed that this exclusion eliminated the need for a relative degree of fault rule
since only negligent parties could seek contribution. Id § 2, Commissioner's Comment. What the
Commission failed to realize is that a negligent tortfeasor could still seek contribution from an
intentional tortfeasor, and consequently there could still be a vast difference in culpability be-
tween parties involved in a contribution suit.
State courts and legislatures gradually started to depart from the pro rata approach, however,
and comparative fault gradually found acceptance in many jurisdictions. The leading case is Dole
v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). See Fischer, supra
note 2, at 1830.
In 1977, the Commission recognized and supported this trend by adopting the UNIFORM COM-
PARATivE FAULT Acr. This act allocates damages by degree of fault. Id § 2. To aid in deter-
mining the degree of fault that should be allocated to each party, the Commission provided five
factors:
(1) whether the conduct was mere inadvertence or engaged in with an awareness of
the danger involved,
(2) the magnitude of the risk created by the conduct, including the number of per-
sons endangered and the potential seriousness of the injury,
(3) the significance of what the actor was seeking to attain by his conduct,
(4) the actor's superior or inferior capacities, and
(5) the particular circumstances, such as the existence of an emergency requiring a
hasty decision.
Id § 2, Commissioner's Comment.
133. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). See notes 109-17 supra and
accompanying text.
134. 449 F. Supp. at 1276. The court also looked to Delaware state law, which apportioned
damages according to degree of fault. Id The court stated that because Delaware state law fol-
lowed a comparative fault allocation of damages rule, and because this rule provided an equitable
result in the case at hand, the court should adopt it. Id
It should be pointed out, however, that contribution is governed by federal common law. See
note 19 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, although the court in McLean could look to
state law for guidance, it was not obligated to follow or apply that rule. See Fischer, supra note 2,
at 1827-28.
The court in Mclean also rejected the shareholder's contention that varying degrees of fault
were absent in the intentional behavior required to violate § 10(b) and therefore a comparative
fault method was not practicable. 449 F. Supp. at 1275. The court, instead, acknowledged the
existence of a "wide spectrum of prohibited behavior" that constituted violations of § 10(b). 449
F. Supp. at 1275. This argument has been reinforced by recent circuit court rulings that various
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McLean rejected the argument that a comparative fault apportion-
ment would undermine the principle of deterrence. 135  The court rea-
soned that a system which holds all wrongdoers liable in proportion to
their wrongdoing is likely to further the deterrence policies of the se-
curities laws136 because each party will realize that greater culpability
will lead to greater liability.3 7  Accordingly, the court apportioned
ninety percent of the judgment to the shareholders and ten percent to
the accountant.'13
D. Analysis
In evaluating the methods of measuring proportional shares for use
in contribution cases, courts must choose the method that is most equi-
table and best serves the deterrence policies of the securities laws.
Thus, courts should require all parties to contribute a portion of the
total liability so as to deter similarly situated parties from engaging in
similar illegal acts in the future. 39
degrees of recklessness also satisfy the requirement of intentional behavior under § 10(b). Some
courts have defined recklessness as an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care that
presents a danger of misleading buyers and sellers. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190
(3d Cir. 1979); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). Other courts have defined recklessness as con-
duct closely approaching conscious deception. See, e.g., Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d
569 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978); Felts v. National Account Sys. Assoc., 446 F.
Supp. 357 (N.D. Miss. 1977). One court has recognized a definition of recklessness as carelessness
approaching indifference. Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1978).
135. 449 F. Supp. at 1275. A comparative fault allocation arguably does not deter the smaller,
less culpable defendant. Such a defendant would pay only a small fraction of the ultimate judg-
ment award.
136. Id
137. Id The court further pointed out that one will not embark on an unlawful course with
the hope that someone more culpable will pay the damages. Id
138. Id at 1276. The court applied the comparative fault test in the following manner.
Applying principles of relative fault to the instant case, the Court concludes that
Schiavi, by issuance of a recklessly prepared audit which misstated the existence of re-
ceivables and consequently gave substance to the fiction of current sales of Technidyne,
is responsible for 10% of McLean's loss. The remaining 90% of McLean's damages are
laid at the feet of the culpable shareholders who in face to face meetings and through
reports, actively misrepresented the assets of the company and knowingly deceived Mc-
Lean as to the facts surrounding both Amvit and the current sales. As a consequence of
their actions, they must bear a greater responsibility for the resultant losses.
Id
139. See Note, sufpra note 4, at 99, which states:
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The pro rata rule is clear and reasonably easy to apply. 4 ° This ap-
proach, however, produces a satisfactory result only when each party's
fault is nearly equal because only then does each party assume a share
of the damages in proportion to its share of the blame. 141 Because the
pro rata method does not take into account the degree of culpability,
the responsibility, or the benefits derived from the violations, a material
difference in any one of these factors among the parties may produce
arbitrary and irrational results. 42
Another factor to consider when establishing the proper allocation of
damages in a securities contribution case is the benefits derived from
the violation. 43 The benefits-derived method is particularly relevant in
those cases in which the benefits derived from a violation are greater
than the defendant's pro rata share of the damages. 44 Leaving such
proceeds in the hands of the violator would unjustly enrich the party
responsible for the wrong and would tend to cancel the deterrent effect
of liability.1 45 A benefits-derived method would force each of the vio-
lators to give up his share of the illegal gains in addition to incurring
the added time and expense of litigation. 146 This result would further
the deterrence policies of the securities laws.
The benefits-derived method, however, has limited usefulness. It
should be used only in those cases in which the party seeking contribu-
The calculation of "adequate deterrence" must necessarily be imprecise. The court's
task in the calculation should be to require all parties found liable to contribute a portion
of the total liability that would adequately deter future misconduct by parties similarly
situated. At the same time, adjustment could be made for differences in the situations of
the parties. Different levels of liability suffice to deter the misconduct of individuals and
organizations, for example. In determining minimum acceptable liability, a court could
perform a function akin to criminal sentencing-within the damages assessed, it may
match punishment and wrongdoer.
Id
140. See notes 83-90 supra and accompanying text.
141. See note 113 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, the results reached in both
Herz.feld and Globus were correct. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
378 F. Supp. 112, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (used pro rata but stated that both parties were equally
culpable and comparative would have led to the same result), a'd in part and rev'd inpart, 540
F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y.)
(same), aj7'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). See note 95 srora and
accompanying text.
142. See notes 113 & 129 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 96-103 supra and accompanying text.
144. See id
145. See note 103 supra.
146. See notes 102-03 supra.
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tion was unjustly enriched.147 Courts routinely have refused to extend
this method to cases in which the party seeking contribution received
no benefit from the violation and in which the effect would be to in-
demnify completely that defendant. 148
Because the court's main task in contribution suits under the securi-
ties laws is to deter future violations, 149 apportioning contribution ac-
cording to the relative degree of fault of each of the parties is the
method most closely related to the goal of deterrence. This method
imposes the greatest burden on the most culpable parties, thereby de-
terring those actions most likely to cause the greatest harm.' 50 The po-
tential violator, recognizing this increase in possible liability, will be
more hesitant to act and much more likely to consider the "degree,
nature, and scope" of future actions.' 5 '
The argument that comparative fault will not adequately deter the
smaller, less culpable party is unpersuasive.152 Awards granted under
the securities laws are often substantial, and even a small portion of a
large award, particularly when added to the time and expense of litiga-
tion, should serve as a sufficient deterrent. In addition, a method that
deters larger and more culpable parties is more beneficial than a
method that concentrates on the smaller, less culpable parties.15 3
Courts should also reject the argument that a comparative fault
method would deter settlements. Plaintiffs and defendants would still
be better off to settle in accordance with their perceived relative fault in
147. See notes 104-07 supra.
148. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
Such a result is justified when the party seeking contribution is an intentional violator because it
is uniformly accepted that an intentional violator should never be indemnified by another securi-
ties violator. See note 4 supra. A more difficult question arises, however, when a negligent de-
fendant seeks contribution from an intentional wrongdoer. Presumably, if the intentional
wrongdoer received all the benefits of the violation, those jurisdictions that permit the complete
indemnification of a negligent defendant by an intentional wrongdoer could reasonably allow
contribution on a benefits-derived theory even if it were to amount to full indemnification. Id
149. See generall' notes 7-8, 106 & 139 supra and accompanying text.
150. See notes 117 & 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
151. See Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, supra note 25.
This argument assumes that charging a more culpable violator with a greater portion of the
liability is more prohibitive than equal apportionment among the several defendants. Id The
counter argument, favoring pro rata apportionment, is that it deters conduct at the very inception
of the violation because the smaller and less culpable defendant who is faced with a share of
liability greatly in excess of his culpability will be discouraged from participating in the violation.
Id
152. See notes 117 & 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
153. See generally notes 117 & 136-38 supra and accompanying text.
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order to avoid the time and expense of litigation as well as the risk of
an ultimate recovery.154 Even if settlements were deterred, however,
"[c]ongestion in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that produces un-
just results in litigation simply to encourage speedy out-of-court
accommodations."1 55
Although the argument that pro rata contribution is easy and expedi-
ent to apply has merit, it has no force in those situations in which the
court can determine the relative fault of the parties with relative cer-
tainty and ease. 156 If impossible or too difficult to allocate fairly the
degrees of fault among the parties in a particular case, the pro rata
method produces an appropriate result.157 But "[plotential problems of
proof in some cases hardly require adherence to an archaic and unfair
rule in all cases."' 58
IV. CONCLUSION
Increased hostility toward indemnification contracts between joint
violators of the securities laws has forced courts to recognize the impor-
tance of contribution in the securities field. 59 The courts, however,
have not yet adopted a uniform approach in this area.' 60 This lack of
clear precedent frees courts to develop an approach that furthers the
deterrence policies of the securities laws and promotes justice and fair-
ness between the parties.
In securities cases involving settlements, the courts should deny con-
tribution from the settling parties and reduce the judgment by the set-
tling party's proportionate share of the damages.' 6' This approach
154. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
Even under a pro rata rule, there is still a wide range of damages for which each defendant
could be held liable. The fact and measure of the ultimate damages award is not certain. Neither
will the settling party be sure whether or not he is to be regarded as part of an entity. See note 128
supra and accompanying text. For example, suppose there are five parties jointly liable for
$1,000,000 in damages. Further, suppose that party A is one of four parties that may be grouped
as an entity. Under this example, A would not know if his share would be $200,000 ($1,000,000
split among five parties) or $125,000 (four parties liable for $500,000 in total, while fifth pai'ty
liable for the remaining $500,000).
155. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975).
156. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
157. See id
158. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 407 (1975).
159. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
160. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 72-79 supra and accompanying text.
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would promote settlements because the settling defendants would be
absolved from future litigation. Reducing the judgment award by the
settling party's share of the damages will ensure that the nonsettling
parties pay only their proportionate shares of the damages.
Courts should apply the pro rata rule when there is no substantial
difference in the degree of fault among the parties. Courts should also
apply the rule when it would be too difficult or impossible to measure
each party's comparative fault.'62 In these cases, the judge should bal-
ance administrative ease and convenience against potential injustice to
any one of the parties that would result by the use of the rule.
Courts should treat the benefits-derived method as a limited excep-
tion. Its application produces rational results only in disgorgement
cases in which the party seeking contribution received material eco-
nomic benefit from the violation. 63 Because the securities laws seek to
require all parties to share in the financial burdens caused by their ac-
tions, this method should not be used when it results in the indemnifi-
cation of an intentional violator. 16
The comparative fault method is especially appropriate in those
cases in which each defendant's wrongful acts are distinct and capable
of accurate measurement such that the court can determine the relative
fault of each defendant. 165 A comparative fault method, while slightly
162. The pro rata rule is most appropriate in those § 10(b) cases in which all the parties partic-
ipated in a scheme to defraud the investing public. Because § 10(b) liability requires scienter, any
attempt to differentiate culpability between the parties could be arbitrary and capricious. See,
eg., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 38 (2d Cir. 1976) (court
unable to detect difference in culpability between selling shareholders and accountant); Globus,
Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (court unable to detect
difference in culpability between selling shareholders and underwriter), aft'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). Caution must still be exercised in these cases, however,
because the scienter requirement for imposing liability may include varying degrees of reckless-
ness and, therefore, material differences of culpability may occasionally exist. See note 134 supra
and accompanying text.
163. See, eg., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
164. See generally note 4 supra and accompanying text. It would seem, however, that in those
jurisdictions where a negligent violator would be allowed indemnification from an intentional
violator, a benefits-derived method could be permitted in a disgorgement if the negligent party
was seeking contribution on this theory from an intentional violator. See id This result would
serve to take away all the illegal profits from the intentional violator that would remain if a pro
rata rule had been applied. The best approach in these cases may be to require each of the parties
to disgorge the illegal profits and then apportion the remaining liability among the parties, using
either a comparative fault or pro rata allocation.
165. This fact pattern will occur mostly in § 10(b) or § 17(a) actions in which the investor is
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more difficult to administer than a pro rata method, imposes a greater
liability on the more culpable party.' 66 This approach is thus consistent
with the fault structure inherent in the securities laws. 167
In conclusion, courts should adopt a general rule favoring a compar-
ative fault allocation of contribution shares among multiple defendants
in securities violations. In applying such a rule, however, courts should
employ a rebuttable presumption that the parties are equally at fault.
Such a case-by-case approach would promote uniformity while grant-
ing the court enough freedom to fashion an equitable allocation based
on the facts and circumstances of each case. The benefits-derived
fraudulently induced to purchase stock by a few private parties. See, e.g., Marrero v. Abraham,
473 F. Supp. 1271 (E.D. La. 1979); Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975), afTd,
542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976).
166. Thus, the comparative fault method should be used in securities cases arising under § 11
or § 10(b) for material misstatements in financial statements or SEC registration statements. In
these cases, the injured investors often sue only the underwriters or accountant for aiding and
abetting the management fraud perpetrated by those false and misleading statements. The ac-
countant or underwriter will then seek contribution from the directors and officers responsible for
the fraud. Here, the accountant may be merely negligent or reckless in not uncovering the fraud,
while the directors and officers of the corporation conceived and deliberately concealed the fraud.
See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978) (accountant sued for misleading
financial statement sought contribution from selling shareholders), rep'd on other grounds, 599
F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F.
Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (accountant sued for misleading financial statements sought contribu-
tion from shareholders and certain other directors and officers); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research
Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (underwriter sued for circulating misleading adver-
tisement of a stock sale sought contribution from issuer and its president), aft'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., 49 F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (accountant sued for false and misleading financial state-
ment sought contribution from selling shareholders and directors and officers of corporation). In
these eases comparative fault should be used to impose the greater burden on those directors and
officers directly responsible for the injury in order to deter similar actions in the future. The
accountant and underwriter, however, should still be responsible for a sufficient share of the judg-
ment award to encourage care and vigilance in the future. The fear that the directors and officers
may turn out to be insolvent and thus not able to contribute their fair share will also promote
diligence by accountants and underwriters.
167. Use of a comparative fault approach would further the deterrence policies of § 1 (f),
which prohibits an intentional violator from seeking contribution from a negligent violator. 15
U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976). Because the culpable party may not recover contribution, this section al-
ready imposes a risk on that party that he will bear a greater portion of the damages. The inten-
tional violator, however, only bears this extra burden if he is the party forced to pay the judgment
award and then subsequently seeks contribution. If a negligent party pays the judgment and seeks
contribution, the intentional violator is forced to pay only his pro rata share. Use of a compara-
tive fault method would further the deterrence policies of § 11, however, by requiring the more
culpable party to pay a greater share of the damages in all cases.
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method and the pro rata method should be employed only when they
will produce more equitable and desirable results.
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